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This paper extends the general equilibrium literature on bank competition in 
order to evaluate its role on the performance of the monetary policy. A new 
formulation of a financial contract taking into consideration both market 
power by banks as well as costly state verification is proposed here. 
Numerical simulations with the model economy parameterized to the 
Brazilian case are performed. Two cases are examined: One in which the 
banking sector is perfectly competitive and the other one when banks have 
market power. The main conclusions of the paper are the following: (1) 
Greater competition in the loan market enhances the response of the real 
economy to an interest rate shock; (2) Increased competition and/or a more 
efficient verification technology reduce the reaction of both the default rate 
and of the bank interest spread to an interest rate shock; and (3) The 
influence of the verification technology in the economy’s dynamic response 
is greater when banks operate under perfect competition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  An increasing concentration in the banking industry has been observed in Brazil 
[Corazza (2000)] and in many other countries in the recent past. Sapienza (2002), for 
example, reports that 3,600 mergers and acquisitions took place in the U.S. financial 
sector between 1979 and 1994. A similar behavior was observed in Europe and in 
Japan. Perhaps in connection to these facts, Cetorelli (2001) observes an increasing 
interest both in the research and in the public debate related to the role played by bank 
competition in the overall economy. The bulk of this literature, however, relies on 
partial equilibrium analysis. Only recently, general equilibrium approaches focusing on 
the influence of the banking sector market structure in the economic performance 
started to be developed. Amongst such studies, Guzman (2000) and Cetorelli (1997) 
examined the role of banking competition in the capital accumulation process and in the 
economic growth. In another paper, Smith (1998) addressed the role of bank’s market 
power in the business cycles and in the income level determination. 
 
  The aim of this paper is to extend this general equilibrium literature in order to 
examine how the market structure in the banking sector affects the performance of the 
monetary policy. To be more precise, we examine how key variables from a model 
economy react to an interest rate shock under two alternative scenarios: One when the 
banking industry operates under perfect competition, and the other one when banks 
have market power. Also related to this issue, we analyze whether or not the banking 
sector market structure plays a role on the influence of the verification technology in the 
transmission of the monetary policy. 
 
  The verification technology follows the costly state verification approach, as 
pioneered by Townsend (1979). There are information asymmetries between lenders 
and borrowers. That is, the borrower can costless observe the outcome of his 
production, but the lender has to bear some costs in order to observe such outcome. A 
model of a loan contract between entrepreneurs that require external finance and banks 
will be presented. Following Gale and Hellwig (1985), the entrepreneur’s budget 
constraint is formulated as a contract problem. In the contract developed in the paper, 
the entrepreneur’s budget constraint will be affected by bank’s market power. As in 
Gale and Hellwig (1985), such budget constraint does not necessarily require that the  
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entrepreneur fully pays his debt. Moreover, the impact of verification costs in the 
distribution of rents between the entrepreneur and the financial intermediary will be 
stronger than in the contract devised by Gale and Hellwig (1985), who only deals with 
the case of a perfect competitive financial intermediary. 
 
  The roles played by bank competition and by the verification technology will be 
examined in a model akin to what Repullo and Suarez (2000) call the broad credit 
channel, also known as the balance sheet channel [Bernanke and Gertler (1995)], 
following the literature initiated by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). The issues raised here 
adapt quite well to this branch of the literature, which has emphasized the role played by 
imperfections in financial markets in the transmission of monetary shocks. In particular, 
this literature has shown that the impact of such shocks depends, to some extent, on the 
net worth of the borrowers.  
 
  The model economy developed in the paper is a dynamic general equilibrium 
model designed to study responses to a monetary policy shock. Money is introduced 
through the assumption that real balances yield utility to the household. Prices are 
perfectly flexible. Monetary policy is modeled as an interest rate rule.  
 
   One feature of the model economy is the existence of endogenous verification 
costs in the production of capital goods. These goods will be sold at a premium over its 
production costs to pay for the deadweight loss of the expected insolvency. When the 
banking sector has market power, it will capture part of the rents generated in the 
context of the verification costs, which will reduce the response of the capital goods 
production to a change in the interest rate. An increase in the borrowing requirements 
will, ceteris paribus, raise the verification costs as well as the external finance premium, 
as is traditional in the balance sheet channel literature. 
 
The major contribution of the model is the examination of the role played by 
bank competition in the transmission of the monetary policy in the context of the broad 
credit channel approach. In addition, the model structure also allows one to examine 
how the effects of information asymmetries change according to bank competition. To 
the best of our knowledge, this investigation is new in the literature. The feature of the 
model that makes the investigation of such issues possible is the loan contract devised in  
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the paper, which allows for the presence of banks with market power in a context of 
asymmetric information. 
 
  An article close in scope to ours is the one due to Smith (1998). However, his 
model structure does not allow one to investigate the effects of bank competition in the 
transmission of monetary policy. The way market power is modeled is also different. 
Smith (1998) introduces market power through a circular economy as in Salop (1979), 
with geographic entry restrictions and switching costs. In the model developed here, 
market power is introduced as in Monti (1972) and Klein (1971), although we also 
restrict entry of new banks. 
 
  The only other model we are aware of that incorporates a banking sector in a 
broad credit channel environment, and also examines the role of monetary policy, is the 
one developed by Fuerst (1995). However, his bank sector is restricted to be perfect 
competitive, and his model is one of limited participation where the monetary policy is 
set according to money aggregates. By contrast, we examine interest rate rules. 
 
  The model presented here is parameterized to the Brazilian economy. Different 
simulations are performed under different assumptions for the verification technology 
and for the bank competition. Impulse-response functions of the key variables are 
computed. 
 
  The paper is structured as follows. Following this Introduction, Section 2 
develops the general equilibrium model. Section 3 briefly presents the model 
parameterization. Section 4 shows the dynamic simulations and comments the results. 
The paper ends with brief conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
  The model economy is composed by five types of agents, namely: households, 
entrepreneurs, firms, banks, and the government. There is a continuum of identical 
families and identical entrepreneurs, indexed in the unit interval. There are λ 
entrepreneurs, and 1−λ households, λ ∈ (0,1). There are numerous firms producing the  
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final consumption goods, and some banks that intermediate among the households, the 
entrepreneurs, and the firms. Banks have access to a bond market where the government 
also participates. There is a monetary authority within the government who determines 
the interest rate of public bonds as well as the reserve requirements on bank deposits. 




  Households are infinitely lived. In each period of their lives, each household is 
endowed with one unit of time. The household aims to maximize the present expected 
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where Et is the conditional expectation operator, conditioned on the information set 
available in period t, β∈(0,1) is the intertemporal discount rate, ct+j ≥ 0 is the household 
real consumption in period t+j, mt+j+1 ≥ 0 represents the nominal money balances kept 
by the household at the end of period t+j, Pt+j ≥ 0 is the money price of the final goods 
in period t+j, ht+j ∈ [0,1] represents the time dedicated to work, and 1 – ht+j is the time 
dedicated to leisure, both in period t+j.  ( ) j t j t 1 j t j t h 1 , P m , c U + + + + + −  is a function 
representing time separable preferences, and satisfying some usual conditions:
1 
U1(t+j)>0, U11(t+j)<0, U2(t+j)>0, U22(t+j)<0, U3(t+j)>0, U33(t+j)<0,  U12(t+j)≥0, 
U13(t+j)≥0, and U23(t+j)≥0. 
 
  Households can lend their resources to banks by holding bank deposits, dt. 
Banks pay a gross deposit rate given by (1+RDt). Both the principal as well as the 
interest payments are paid to the household at the beginning of the following period. We 
assume that each family owns an equal share of the banks, receiving part of their profits, 
Bf
t π , at the beginning of the next time period. 
                                                 
1 The Ci(t) notation indicates the partial derivative of the C(.) function with respect to its i-th argument, 
evaluated in period t. Analogous interpretation applies for Cii(t).  
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  Households own the capital stock, kt ≥ 0, and rent their capital holdings to final 
goods producers at the real price
2 rt ≥ 0. Capital goods are produced by entrepreneurs 
and bought by households at the real price qt ≥ 0. However, new capital goods are only 
available for renting by the firms in the next time period. 
 












1 t 1 Dt
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+ −
− − −    (2) 
 
where wt ≥ 0 is the real wage, 
f
t i  ≥ 0 is the investment in new capital goods, and τt is the 
lump sum tax paid to the government. 
 
  The optimization problem faced by the household is to maximize the discounted 
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The static first order condition governing the relation between the household 
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The remaining first order conditions can be summarized by the following Euler 
equations: 
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2 Real prices are quoted in units of the final good. All variables are in real terms, with the exception of 
nominal money balances, mt, and, obviously, the monetary price, Pt.  
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where capital accumulation is governed by equation (5), the optimal decision 
concerning bank deposits is given by equation (6), and equation (7) regulates the 




  Firms produce the final good under competitive conditions. Each firm has access 
to a constant returns to scale technology production. This technology employs labor and 




t t t t H , H , K F Y =           ( 8 )  
 
where Yt ≥ 0 is the aggregate production of the final good, Kt ≥ 0 is the aggregate 
capital stock, Ht ≥ 0 is the aggregate labor supply of households, and 
e
t H  ≥ 0 is the 
aggregate labor supply of entrepreneurs. The production function is assumed to be 
neoclassical, i.e., for positive input values, this technology is increasing and concave 
with respect to each factor of production – F1(t) > 0, F2(t) > 0, F3(t) > 0, F11(t) < 0, F22(t) 
< 0, F33(t) < 0 –, and this technology also satisfies the Inada conditions: 
() () ( ) () ( ) () 0 t F lim t F lim t F lim 3
h
2 h 1 k e = = =
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → , and  () () =
↓
t F lim 1
0 k
  () () =
↓
t F lim 2
0 h
  () () ∞ =
↓




  Labor has to be paid before production starts. Thus, at the beginning of each 
period, the firm needs to find a bank to finance its payroll bill. This loan will be paid 
back at the end of the period at a gross rate ( )
F
Lt R 1+ . It is also assumed that firms can 
pay the rent on capital goods after the production. So, firms do not need to seek credit to 
finance this component of their costs. 
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  Input markets are competitive. Thus, in equilibrium, capital rent is equal to 
capital marginal product, rt = F1(t). By the same token, the financing constraint implies 
that wages are given by  () () ( )
F
Lt 2 t R 1 t F w + = , and  () () ( )
F
Lt 3 t R 1 t F n + = , where nt ≥ 0 
is the wage paid by entrepreneur’s work. 
 
2.3 Entrepreneurs and information asymmetries 
 
  When entrepreneurs are allowed to live for many periods, one needs to consider 
a possible heterogeneity in the amount of internal funds available to them. However, it 
is not a trivial task to deal with the distribution of the internal funds and the way this 
distribution affects the aggregate economy. In order to overcome such difficulties, 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, p. 894) assume that both the entrepreneur’s production 
function and the verification costs are linear. This assumption allows that only the 
aggregate value of the internal funds affects the equilibrium. However, under such 
assumption, the model developed in the present paper would not have a solution for the 
financial contract once banks are allowed to have market power. It is therefore required 
that either the entrepreneur’s production function or the verification technology (or 
both) show decreasing returns. In what follows, we assume that there are decreasing 
returns in the verification technology. Moreover, following Fuerst (1995), it is assumed 
that each entrepreneur lives only for one period.
3 
 
Following Fuerst (1995, p.1324), new entrepreneurs are born at the beginning of 
each period and they die at the end of it. Each entrepreneur is endowed with one unit of 
time, which they inelastically supply to the firms in exchange for a wage rate equal to 
nt. The wage rate nt represents the net worth or the internal funds of each entrepreneur.  
 
Entrepreneurs have risk neutral preferences over consumption and they have 
access to a stochastic technology that transforms, within each time period, consumption 
goods into capital goods. To be more precise, 
e
t i  units of consumption goods are 
                                                 
3 According to Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997), an empirical stylized fact is that default rates 
decline during economic booms. However, models where the entrepreneur lives for many periods - as e.g. 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998, 2001) - predict that the default rate increases during economic booms. 
This behavior is due to the initial response of internal funds. Since such funds are primarily formed by 
previously accumulated capital, their reaction is not immediate. The increased production therefore 
requires a substantial amount of external finance and, as a consequence, the default ratio increases.  
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transformed into κt
e
t i  units of capital, where 
e
t i ∈[0,∞). κ is an idiosyncratic productivity 
shock, which is i.i.d. along the periods as well as among the entrepreneurs. Its support is 
non-negative. Its distribution function, Φ(κ), and its density function, φ(κ), are known 
by all agents. The density function φ(κ) is strictly positive and continuously 
differentiable in the interval [0,∞).  
 
There are information asymmetries in the sense that each entrepreneur is better 
informed about the outcome of his production than any other agent. Formally, κ can be 
privately and costless observed by the entrepreneur, while other agents have to pay a 
cost of C(
e i ) units of capital to observe this outcome, where C:ℜ+→ℜ+,  ( ) 0 di dC
e ≥ , 
( ) 0 di C d
2 e 2 ≥ , ∀ 
e i >0. A particular decreasing returns functional form is assumed for 




t i i C µ = .  
 
In order to make the problem of asymmetric information relevant in the model, 
we assume that nt is sufficiently small. Thus, entrepreneurs need to seek external 
finance. This credit will be provided by the banking sector. It is assumed that each 
entrepreneur borrows from only one bank. 
 




t n i l − =  units of consumption goods before 




Lt l R 1+  units of capital 
goods at the end of the period. However, given the stochastic nature of his technology, 
he will not be able to meet his financial obligations if the idiosyncratic productivity 











≡ κ           ( 9 )  
 
∗ κt  can be interpreted as a critical insolvency level. When 
∗ κ < κ t t , the bank monitors 
the project outcome paying a cost of 
2 e
t i µ  units of capital, and confiscates all the 
entrepreneur’s production. The financial contract offered by the entrepreneur to the 
bank will therefore be a standard debt contract.  
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It is interesting to observe that expression (9) implies that an increase in the loan 
interest rate leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase in the critical insolvency level. The 
model therefore implies a positive relation between the default ratio and the loan 
interest rate. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of the entrepreneur’s activities along any 
period t. 
 
Figure 1. Timing sequence of an entrepreneur’s activities in period t 







↓    ↓    ↓    ↓   
period t 












  Banks play the role of financial intermediaries between families on one side and 
firms and entrepreneurs on the other. Banks receive deposits from the first group and 
lend to the last ones. On the loan side, it is assumed that each bank holds a sufficiently 
large portfolio such that the idiosyncratic risk is completely diversified away. Thus, the 
loan portfolio of each bank yields a non-stochastic return. Each bank makes also 
transactions in the public bonds market. 
 
  Following an industrial organization approach [see e.g. Freixas and Rochet 
(1997, ch.3)], bank activity is modeled as involving the production of deposit and loan 
services. Bank technology is represented by the cost function C(D, L), which is 
interpreted as the resource costs of managing a volume D of deposits and a volume L of 
loans. The simplifying assumption that all banks have the same cost function is adopted 
here. The banking literature has used different functional forms to represent the cost  
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function.
4 We follow Diáz-Giménez et al. (1992) and assume constant returns to scale 
as well as additive separability. Thus, there is a ηD cost per unit value of deposits and a 
ηL cost per unit value of loans. 
 
With separability (∂
2C/∂D∂L = 0) and null cross effects, the model implies that 
the decision problem the bank faces is separable across the two markets. Thus, the 
optimal deposit interest rate does not depend on features of the loan market; similarly, 
the optimal loan interest rate is independent of the deposit market [see Freixas and 
Rochet (1997, p.59)]. 
 
Banks participate in three markets: loans, deposits, and bonds. In the loan 
market, banks discriminate prices between two categories of borrowers: one, who are 
subject to asymmetric information, namely the entrepreneurs; and, the other, who are 
not, namely the firms. When lending to firms, banks act in imperfect competition, 
Cournot style. When lending to entrepreneurs, banks sign financial contracts where their 
first order condition for maximum profits is being attended. The loan demand curve is 









Lt l g R = , where 
F
Lt R  is the net loan interest rate to firms, 
e
Lt R  is the net loan interest 
rate charged from an entrepreneur “e”, 
F
t L  is the total amount of loans to firms, and 
be
t l  
is the volume of loans from a bank “b” to an entrepreneur “e”. 
 
The focus of this paper is on the information asymmetries in the loan market. 
Thus, to simplify matters, it is assumed that the technology for deposits is freely 
accessible and each bank acts as in perfect competition in this market. Each bank 
assumes that the deposit interest rate RDt is given by the market. The bank decision 
variables are the amount of loans and the amount of deposits it accepts. In the bonds 
market, banks take the public bonds interest rate Rt as a policy instrument that is set by 
the monetary authority. 
 
                                                 
4 For instance, Edwards and Végh (1997, p.246-247) assume complementarity between deposits and loans 
in the sense that CDL(.)<0. In addition to complementarity, Catão and Rodriguez (2000, p.20) present a 
cost function that implies a convex relation between the loan interest spread and the loan supply. These 
authors believe that such features are stylized in the literature. By contrast, English (2000, p.10), among 
others, make the extreme assumption that banking intermediation activity is costless.  
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Bank profits can be written as the sum of the intermediation margins the bank 
expects from loans and deposits, minus the costs. After taking into account the 
asymmetric information, the expected profit for a bank “b” is given by: 
 
() () ()( )
() () () () ()
()
() () () ()






































d dj j l l d R R 1
l R R dj j l R 1 dj d j n j l
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where J∈(0,λ] represents the measure of entrepreneurs borrowing from bank b, 
() 0 j t ≥ κ
∗   is the  critical insolvency level for entrepreneur j∈(0, J],  () j R
e
Lt >0 is the 
interest rate charged from entrepreneur j,  () 0 j l
be
t ≥  is the amount of loans from bank b 
to entrepreneur j,  () 0 j n t ≥  is the amount of internal funds of entrepreneur j,  0 l
bF
t ≥  is 
the amount of loans from bank b to the firms,  0 d
b
t ≥  is the amount of deposits at bank 
b, α≥0 is the reserve requirements rate on deposits set by the monetary authority, and Rt 
≥ 0 is the net basic interest rate, also set by the monetary authority.  
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 is the expected return 
from the solvent entrepreneurs. The expected return on the bankrupt entrepreneurs is 
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RDt = (1−α)Rt − ηD          ( 1 3 )  
 
where  ) R (
F











= ε           ( 1 4 )  
 
  Expressions (11)-(13) indicate that if the interest rate on public bonds increases, 
ceteris paribus interest rates on both loans and deposits also increase. One can also 
observe that an increase in the loan market competition, as measured by a more elastic 




Lt R R − . 
 
  Figure 2 shows a diagram with the activities of a bank “b” during and at the end 
of a period t. 
                                                 
5 The interest spread for loans to entrepreneurs is given by:  ( ) () Dt
e
Lt t R 1 R 1 q + − + .  
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Figure 2. Activities of bank “b” in period t 
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2.5 Financial contract 
 
The entrepreneur goes to the credit market and offers a debt contract that will, 
hopefully, be demanded by some bank. Following, to some extent, the financial contract 
devised by English (2000, p.11), we consider that the entrepreneur decides how much to 
borrow by maximizing his expected return taking into consideration the constraint that 
the bank maximization condition has to be satisfied. If this constraint were not satisfied, 
then the bank, which has market power, would not be maximizing its profits. Moreover, 
if the expected return of the entrepreneur is not maximized subject to this constraint, 
then it is conceivable that some other bank could come out with another debt contract 
that would be more attractive to the entrepreneur and yet would be maximizing the  
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bank’s profits.
6 The optimal contract offered by the entrepreneur to the bank is given by 
the vector (
be
t l , 
e
Lt R , 
∗ κt ) satisfying: 
 
() ( ) [] () { } ∫
∞









t t , l
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() () [] ()


 κ κ φ + µ − κ −





































R  (16) 
 
where identity (9) holds for entrepreneur j. 
 
  It is interesting to observe that the entrepreneur is not going to decide the 
amount of loans to be demanded given the loan interest rate. Instead, the entrepreneur is 
going to choose the amount of loans and the optimal default probability subject to the 
satisfaction of the first order condition of the bank. The loan interest rate is 
simultaneously determined through condition (9). It is also important to note that we are 
assuming a limited liability constraint, i.e. the entrepreneur cannot pay to the bank more 
than his final assets (final production), ruling out the possibility of negative 
consumption. 
 
The solution to the contract problem is given by two implicit functions: 
 
() t t t
be
t R , n , q l l =           ( 1 7 )  
() t t t t R , n , q κ = κ
∗           ( 1 8 )  
 
where qt and nt are both determined in the economy’s general equilibrium, and Rt is 
exogenous. 
                                                 
6 This argument is analogous to one presented by Gale and Hellwig (1985, p.651). Besides, it is 
interesting to note that English (2000) examines the differences in outcomes when the borrower considers 
and when he does not consider the constraint regarding the profit maximization of the financial 
intermediary on his optimization problem.  




  Both government spending and the interest payment on public debt are financed 




1 t M M − + , and by lump sum taxes levied on the households, 
Tt. The government budget constraint is given by: 
 




1 t t t t t B P R 1 B P M M T P G P + − + − + = +       ( 1 9 )  
 
where Gt ≥ 0 is the amount of government spending, and Bt is the amount of public 
debt. It is assumed that public bonds are issued at the beginning of each period and 
redeemed at the end of the same period, when the interest payments are also made. To 
simplify matters, it is assumed that government spending has effect neither in the utility 
functions nor in the production functions. 
 
Monetary and fiscal policies give support to the nominal interest rate policy, Rt. 
Since monetary policy is modeled as an interest rate rule, money supply endogenously 





  The model is evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium. Market clearing conditions 
for each market can be written as: 
 
Labor market for households: 
Ht = (1−λ)ht           ( 2 0 )  
Labor market for entrepreneurs: 
e
t H = λ            ( 2 1 )  
Market for final goods: 
e
t Π  + (1−λ)ct + λ
e
t i  + Gt = Yt          ( 2 2 )   
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Market for capital goods: 




t t 1 t i i K 1 K µ κ Φ − λ = δ − −
∗
+         ( 2 3 )  
Loan market for entrepreneurs: 
λ(
e




t dj j l          ( 2 4 )  




t t t t Nl H n H w = +           ( 2 5 )  
Deposit market: 
b
t Nd = (1−λ)dt           ( 2 6 )  
Bond market: 
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t t M m 1 = λ −           ( 2 8 )  
 
where N is the number of banks in the economy, and  0
e
t ≥ Π  is the aggregate 
consumption by the entrepreneurs (equal to their profits). 
  A dynamic general equilibrium is defined by decision rules for Kt+1, dt, RDt, 
(Mt+1/Pt), 
b
t π , ct, Ht, qt, 
F
Lt R , (Pt/Pt-1), 
∗ κt , 
e
t i , Yt, 
e
Lt R , 
be
t l , 
e
t Π , Bt, 
bF
t l , Tt, where these 
decision rules are stationary functions of (Rt, Kt, dt-1, RDt-1, (Mt/Pt-1), 
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where (29) is the production function of final goods, (30) is the household budget 
constraint, (31) to (34) are the first order conditions for the households, (35) and (36) 
are the first order conditions for the banks, (37) and (38) come from the first order  
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conditions of the financial contract, (39) is the movement law for the capital stock, (40) 
is the market clearing condition for final goods, (41) is the market clearing condition in 
the bond market, (42) is the market clearing condition in the loan market for firms, (43) 
is the government budget constraint, (44) defines the critical insolvency level, (45) is 
the entrepreneur’s budget constraint, (46) is the aggregate entrepreneurs’ profits 
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where ζ = 0.0159, and ξ = 1.4317. The intertemporal discount rate is set at β = 0.9140.
7 
 
The population share of entrepreneurs can be considered as an arbitrary 
normalization without practical consequences for the qualitative conclusions of the 
model economy. We then set λ = 0.05. 
 
The functional form for the production function for final goods is taken to be a 
Cobb-Douglas: 
 
3 2 1 e
t t t t H H K Y
α α α =           ( 4 9 )  
 
where the capital income share is α1 = 0.49, a similar value to the ones reported by 
Araújo and Ferreira (1999, p.141), and by Bugarin and Ellery Jr. (2002) for the 
Brazilian economy. The share of household income is set at α2 = 0.50, and the share of 
entrepreneur income is set at α3 = 0.01. This last value assures that the entrepreneur’s 
internal funds are positive. 
                                                 
7 The values for these parameters for the Brazilian economy were estimated by GMM in Alencar and 
Nakane (2003). The reported values are the median estimates found for the logarithmic utility function.  
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The technology for capital goods production is stochastic. Following Fuerst 
(1995, p.1325), it is assumed that the distribution function for the productivity shock, 
() κ Φ , follows a uniform distribution in the interval [0.5; 1.5]. The quarterly 
depreciation rate for the capital stock is set at δ = 0.0164, following Araújo and Ferreira 
(1999, p.143). 
 
  There were 160 commercial banks operating in Brazil by December 2001, 
according to Central Bank figures. However, not all of them can be qualified as typical 
retail banks, as our model implies. A great number of them have their core activities in 
the bonds markets and not in the credit markets. Retail banks usually have large branch 
networks. Out of 160, only 41 banks had more than 10 branches in the country by 
December 2001. The total number of banks in the simulations is then set to 40. 
 
There are no available estimates for operational costs associated to the loan and 
deposit activities for Brazilian banks. We then use the estimates reported by Diaz-
Gimenez  et al. (1992, p.551) for the U.S. The marginal cost of deposits is ηD = 
0.11875%, and the marginal cost of loans is ηL = 0.5625%. The reserve requirement 
ratio on deposits is set at α = 0.45, which is close to the average values observed in 
Brazil. 
 
With regard to the verification technology parameter, we examine the 
economy’s behavior when µ changes from 0.3 to 0.2. A reduction in this parameter can 
be interpreted as a more efficient verification technology available to the banks, or else 
as a reduction in information asymmetries. 
 
Some other assumptions related to the steady state values for some variables are 
also made. First, it is assumed that government spending and tax revenues are equal in 
steady state. Second, the steady state inflation rate is zero. Third, it is assumed that 
households allocate 35% of their time to work activities, a figure consistent with 
available survey evidence from IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística). 
Fourth, the volume of bonds represents 86% of the final goods production, and real 
money balances amount to 46% of household’s consumption. These last ratios are in  
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agreement with what one observes for Brazil in 2001 according to data available from 





In order to study the dynamic properties of the model, the equilibrium equations 
are first log-linearized around the steady state solution. Once the log-linearized system 
is obtained, the method due to Uhlig (1999) is employed to compute the movement laws 
of the recursive equilibrium as well as to generate the impulse-response functions that 
describe the dynamic behavior of the economy. 
 
All the dynamic simulations performed here try to track the response to an 
unexpected reduction of a one-standard deviation in the basic interest rate, which 
follows the following stochastic process: 
 
log Rt = (1-ρ) log R + ρ log Rt-1 + εt,        (50) 
 
where R is the steady state value of the net interest rate, ρ is the persistence term for the 
interest rate, and εt is a random shock, serially uncorrelated with zero mean and finite 
variance. 
 
Both the persistence term as well as the standard deviation for the random shock 
were taken from the estimates reported by Maziero and Nakane (2002). Using Brazilian 
quarterly data for the 1994:3 to 2001:2 period, they report an estimated value for ρ 
equal to 0.52, and a standard deviation of 0.0274 for the random shock.  
 
Government spending, Gt, is held fixed in all the simulations. On the other hand, 
taxes, Tt, vary together with money supply and bond issue to give support to the interest 
rate policy. Similar assumptions are made by Bernanke et al. (1999), and by Gertler et 
al. (2003). 
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We report the simulations related to the main variables of interest in Figures 3 to 
5 enclosed at the end of the paper. These figures show the impulse-response functions 
for different variables given a one-standard deviation reduction in the basic interest rate 
in period 0. The economy is, initially, in a steady-state equilibrium. All the figures 
present the percent deviation from the steady state values for each period following the 
shock. 
 
Figure 3 compares the impulse response when the verification cost parameter is 
reduced from µ = 0.30 to µ = 0.20 in the case when banks have market power.
8 As a 
general comment, one can see that all the variables change in the expected direction. A 
second general comment is that the changes in the dynamic responses due to different 
verification technologies are small. Better verification technology slightly increases the 
reaction of the final good production, and of the household labor. The variables more 
directly related to the sector where information asymmetries occur show a greater 
response in view of the change towards more efficient verification technology. This can 
be illustrated by the responses of the capital stock, the entrepreneur’s investment, the 
entrepreneur’s borrowing, the entrepreneur’s net worth, and the aggregate profits of the 
entrepreneurs. By contrast, a better verification technology reduces the dynamic 
response of both the default rate, and of the interest loan spread to the entrepreneurs.  
 
We will now try to provide some intuition for the results shown in the figures. 
 
4.1 Household labor, production of final goods, and entrepreneur net worth 
 
The  household labor reaction – and, to some extent, the production of final 
goods – can be better understood when one considers the movements in the demand for 
and the supply of labor in the (Ht, wt) space, following an argument analogous to the 
one developed by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992, p.348). The producer of final 
goods chooses the optimum amount of labor by equating the marginal product of labor 
                                                 
8 The choice for such values for µ is arbitrary. One can observe, however, that when µ takes smaller 
values, the steady state default rate reduces. For the chosen values for µ, the steady state default rate is in 
the range of 29%, considerably higher than the values found for the Brazilian economy. One possible 
explanation for the high default rate implied by the model is the low quarterly intertemporal discount rate, 
β = 0.914, which implies an extremely high value for the steady state interest rate, equal to 89.47 % per 
year, which, in turn, has a negative impact on the equilibrium default rate.  
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to its marginal cost. Given the working capital constraint stating that the firm needs to 
borrow to meet its payroll expenses, a reduction in interest rates shifts the labor demand 
to the right. On the other side, equation (4) is equivalent to a static labor supply 
function. This expression is not affected by the interest rate reduction, conditioned on a 
fixed value for the marginal utility of consumption. Thus, a reduction in the interest rate 
shifts the labor demand to the right without any compensatory movement in the labor 
supply. In general equilibrium, this movement explains the increase in both the 
household labor and in the real wage. It also helps to explain the increase in the 
production of final goods. An analogous argument justifies the increase in the 
entrepreneur’s net worth, which is measured by his wage. 
 
4.2 Capital stock, real price of capital, and entrepreneur’s investment 
 
The effects of interest rates on the capital stock are also better traced out when 
one considers the supply and demand schedules in the (Kt, qt) space. The expected 
capital supply at the end of period t is given by: 
 
() () () () [] () { }
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ κ Φ κ µ − κ λ + δ − = κ t
2
t t t t
e
t t t t
e
t t t t t
S , R , n , q i , R , n , q i K 1 , R , n , q K  (51) 
 
where  ( )
∗ κt t t t
e , R , n , q i  is the value of the investment of the capital goods producer – 
the entrepreneur –, which is determined, in partial equilibrium terms, in the financial 
contract that solves (17) and (18).
9 The supply of expected new capital in the symmetric 
equilibrium is given by  () () [] () { }
∗ ∗ ∗ κ Φ κ µ − κ λ t
2
t t t t
e
t t t t
e , R , n , q i , R , n , q i . It is quite 
intuitive that the presence of asymmetric information generates a positive sloped supply 
for capital goods since, ceteris paribus, a higher production of capital goods requires 
more external finance, which increases the production costs. Such intuitive outcome can 
actually be numerically computed by making use of the implicit function theorem in the 
steady state equilibrium.
10 When µ = 0.30, for example, ( ) 11 . 1 q K t
S ≅ ∂ ∂  > 0 in the 
steady state. This same procedure can be applied with respect to shifts in the interest 
rate. When µ = 0.30 one obtains ( ) 73 . 1 R K t
S − ≅ ∂ ∂  < 0, and when µ = 0.20 one obtains 
                                                 





t n l i + = . 
10 The system of equations used for the computations are given by (17), (18), and (3).  
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( ) 13 . 2 R K t
S − ≅ ∂ ∂  < 0 – both evaluated at the steady state. These results imply that, 
ceteris paribus, an interest rate fall shifts the expected capital supply schedule to the 
right, and the shift is greater when µ = 0.20, which is what is actually observed in 
Figure 3.  
 
The capital demand curve is given by expression (32) and it is not directly 
influenced by interest rates. Thus, a reduction in interest rates leads, at least in partial 
equilibrium, to an increase in the production of capital goods and to a reduction in the 
real price of such goods. Figure 3 shows that these effects are not reverted in general 




4.3 Entrepreneur’s borrowing 
 
  The production of capital goods is partially financed by banks. Thus, a natural 
outcome of the expansion in the production of capital goods is an increase in the 
demand for loans by entrepreneurs. 
 
4.4 Household consumption 
 
  Household consumption is affected by several factors. On one side, the fall in 
interest rates leads to a negative wealth effect, which helps to reduce consumption. On 
the other side, the substitution effect leads to higher present-to-future consumption 
ratios. For the logarithmic utility specification used in the paper these two effects cancel 
each other out. However, there are other effects working to raise the family wealth, 
notably a fall in lump sum taxes, and an increase in the dividends paid by banks. Thus, 
in general equilibrium, the fall in interest rates leads to an increase in consumption. 
                                                 
11 Notice that capital stock is predetermined in the period when interest rate changes. The demand for 
capital by households, however, increases in the initial period; therefore, in this period, one observes an 
increase in the real price of capital.  
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4.5 Default rate, and loan interest spread for entrepreneurs 
 
  Figure 3 shows that both the default rate as well as the interest spread for loans 
to the entrepreneurs reduce with the fall in interest rates. Similar results were obtained 
by Cooley and Nam (1998, p.612). A possible reason for the fall in the default rate is the 
fact that the increase in the entrepreneur’s net worth was proportionately greater than 
the increase in the borrowed loans. The premium on external funds was then reduced. 
With regard to the interest spread to the entrepreneurs, the observed reduction is due to 
the joint effect of the reduction in the premium on external funds, a lower default rate, 
and a lower real price for capital. 
 
4.6 Bank profits, and entrepreneurs’ aggregate profits 
 
 Christiano  et al. (1997) have found empirical evidence that profits from different 
economic sectors fall after a positive interest rate shock. The movements of bank profits 
and of entrepreneurs’ aggregate profits reported in Figure 3 are in line with this 
evidence. 
 
4.7 Additional comments 
 
  The movement observed for the real price of capital goods in Figure 3 is the 
opposite of the one reported by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001, p.17). In their paper, the 
fall in interest rates leads to an increase in the real price of capital goods. This outcome 
is, to some extent, unexpected since a greater capital stock would reduce its marginal 
productivity as well as its unit expected return. The difference between our results and 
theirs is probably due to the way the financial intermediary is modeled in the two 
papers. The basic interest rate is not an opportunity cost for the financial intermediary in 
Carlstrom and Fuerst’s model. As a result, the basic interest rate does not directly 
affects the capital supply schedule, as it does in our model. Without such effect, the 
general equilibrium result is an increase in the capital goods real price, probably due to 
the higher agency cost caused by an increased investment by the entrepreneurs.  
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4.8 Perfect competition in loan markets 
 
  We now modify the model by making the assumption that banks operate in 
perfect competition not only in the deposit market but also in the loan market. The 
assumption of entry barriers in the banking sector can now be relaxed. The number of 
banks in equilibrium is the one that is consistent with zero profits for banks. The 
relevance of this extension is that we can directly compare our results with the 
traditional CSV literature that assumes perfect competition in financial markets. One 
can therefore investigate if the assumption of market power qualitatively changes the 
influence of information asymmetries in the economy. 
 
  A first modification in the model is related to the optimum loan interest rate to 
the firms. The bank’s first order condition related to loans to the firms – equation 




Lt R R η + =           ( 5 2 )  
 
  A second modification occurs in the loan market for the entrepreneurs. The 
financial contract offered by the entrepreneur to the bank is not constrained by the 
satisfaction of the bank’s first order condition anymore. Instead, the new financial 
contract aims at maximizing the expected return to the entrepreneur subject to the 
constraint that the expected profit for the bank in such contract is zero. In other terms, 
the financial contract is given by the vector (
be
t l , 
e
Lt R , 
∗ κt ) that is the solution to the 
following problem: 
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where identity (9) has to be satisfied. 
 
The solution to the contract problem is also given by two implicit functions: 
 
() t t t
be
t R , n , q l γ =           ( 5 5 )  
() t t t t R , n , q ϕ = κ
∗           ( 5 6 )  
 
Expressions (55) and (56) replace the corresponding expressions (37) and (38) in 
the system of equations representing the model economy. 
 
Figure 4 presents the economy’s dynamic responses when there is perfect 
competition in the loan market. The variables’ responses are again in the expected 
directions. As a general comment, one can see that the influence of the bank verification 
technology on the dynamic responses is greater in the perfect competition case than in 
the previous one. The influence of the verification technology on the variables more 
directly affected by the information asymmetry – e.g. capital stock, real price of capital 
goods, entrepreneur’s investment, entrepreneur’s borrowing –, which was already quite 
clear in Figure 3, become now even more pronounced. The exceptions to this general 
pattern are the responses of the default rate and of the interest loan spread to 
entrepreneurs. A possible reason for such responses is that in the market power case, 
with the increase in the internal funds, a worsening in the verification technology would 
create a greater share of rents from agency costs to the entrepreneur. 
 
Figure 5 shows the effects of bank competition in the propagation of the 
monetary policy shock. Overall, the effect of increased competition is to enhance the 
reaction of the variables to the shock. The exceptions are represented by the reactions of 
the default rate, of the loan interest spread to entrepreneurs, and of entrepreneurs’ 
aggregate profits. In order to understand such exceptions, it is worthy recalling that 
banks can appropriate part of the agency rents when they have market power. With the 
increase in the internal funds following a reduction in the basic interest rate, the 
opportunity for banks to appropriate such rents reduces. Likewise, entrepreneurs capture 
a larger share of such rents. Hence, the greater negative response of both the default rate  
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as well as of the interest spread and the greater positive response of the entrepreneur’s 
profits are justified. 
 
A possible explanation for the greater economy’s response under perfect 
competition is that this market structure is more conducive to the production of capital 
goods by allowing that all the rents from agency costs be kept by the entrepreneurs. The 
greater response of the capital goods production with the greater fall in their prices 
translate into greater responses of the other variables, with the exception of those 
discussed in the previous paragraph. 
 
  The greater economic response to a monetary policy shock under perfect 
competition of the banking sector is, to some extent, the opposite of the result found by 
Smith (1998). This author examines a version of Bernanke and Gertler’s (1989) model 
with a banking sector, and reaches the conclusion that bank competition reduces 
economic fluctuations.
12 The structure of Smith’s economy is quite distinct from the one 
developed here. Amongst the several differences, the combination of the assumptions 
related to the banking sector and to the entrepreneurs seems to be at the heart of the 
discrepancies in our results. On one hand, Smith (1998) takes the opportunity cost of the 
entrepreneur’s internal funds as being given by the bank deposit interest rate, which is 
fixed in perfect competition but anticyclical under imperfect competition. On the other 
hand, the number of productive entrepreneurs is a decreasing function of the deposit 
interest rate. The conjugation of such assumptions amplifies the economic fluctuations 
when the banking industry is in imperfect competition. However, the anticyclical 
response of the deposit interest rate leads also to an anticyclical behavior of bank 




  This paper developed a dynamic general equilibrium model with a banking 
sector and agency costs to investigate the responses to a monetary policy shock. All the 
variables showed dynamic responses in the expected directions. An unexpected interest 
rate reduction was followed by increases in the production of final goods, in the hours 
                                                 
12 It has to be noticed, however, that Smith (1998) examined the economy’s response to technology 
shocks rather than to monetary policy shocks, as stressed here.  
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worked by the households, in the capital stock, in the household consumption, and in 
the entrepreneur’s investment, borrowing, profits, and net worth. The reduction in the 
interest rates leads also to reductions in the real price of capital goods, in the default 
rate, and in the interest lending spread to entrepreneurs. 
 
  The examination of the dynamic simulations allows also one to state that 
increased competition amongst banks, or improved verification technology of the 
defaulted loans are both associated to enhanced responses of the real economy to 
interest rate shocks, and to less pronounced responses of the default rate and of the 
interest spread to the same shocks. Moreover, it was also possible to observe that the 
assumption of market power in the financial intermediary does not qualitatively change 
the results related to the role played by information asymmetries in the propagation of 
shocks. Nevertheless, there is a quantitative difference in the sense that the influence of 
the verification technology in the economy’s dynamic response is greater when the loan 
market works under perfect competition. Apparently, this last result is new in the 
literature.  
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Figure 3 
Effects of the Verification Technology in the Propagation of an  
Interest Rate Shock when Banks have Market Power 
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Figure 4 
Effects of the Verification Technology in the Propagation of an  
Interest Rate Shock when Banks work in Perfect Competition 
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Figure 5 
Effects of Bank Competition in the 
Propagation of an Interest Rate Shock 
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